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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE
To investigate the prevalence of financial interests 
among patient organisations contributing to health 
technology assessment at the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England and 
the extent to which NICE’s disclosure policy ensures 
that decision making committees are aware of these 
interests.
DESIGN
Policy review using accounts, annual reports, 
and websites of patient organisations; payments 
declared by pharmaceutical manufacturers on their 
websites and a centralised database (Disclosure UK); 
declarations of interests by nominated representatives 
of patient organisations; and responses from patient 
organisations.
SETTING
Appraisals of medicines and treatments 
(technologies) for use in the English and Welsh 
National Health Service.
PARTICIPANTS
53 patient organisations contributing to 41 NICE 
technology appraisals published in 2015 and 
2016, with 117 separate occasions that a patient 
organisation contributed to the appraisal of a 
technology.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES
Prevalence of specific interests (that is, funding from 
manufacturer(s) of a technology under appraisal or 
competitor products); proportion of specific interests 
of which NICE’s decision making committees were 
aware; proportion of unknown specific interests for 
which disclosure was not required by NICE’s policy
RESULTS
38/53 (72%) patient organisations had accepted 
funding from the manufacturer(s) of a technology or 
a competitor product in the same year that they had 
contributed to the appraisal of that technology or 
the previous year. Specific interests were present on 
92/117 (79%) occasions that patient organisations 
contributed to appraisals in 2015 and 2016. NICE’s 
decision making committees were aware of less than 
a quarter of specific interests (30/144; 21%). For 
nearly two thirds of the specific interests not known 
to committees (71/114; 62%), disclosure by patient 
organisations was not required by NICE’s policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Financial interests are highly prevalent among patient 
organisations contributing to health technology 
assessment. NICE should review its disclosure policy 
to ensure that decision making committees are aware 
of all relevant interests.
Introduction
Recent studies have highlighted conflicts of interest 
held by patient organisations and their potential 
influence on public policy.1-4 An investigation of 
104 of the largest patient organisations in the US 
found that at least 83% received financial support 
from pharmaceutical, device, and/or biotechnology 
companies.2 Another survey of 289 US patient 
organisations found that these organisations derived an 
average of 45% of their income from pharmaceutical, 
device, and/or biotechnology companies.3 Three 
quarters of organisations that responded to this survey 
had taken part in policy or advocacy activities in the 
previous fiscal year, with two out of three receiving 
industry funding in the same year as their policy/
advocacy activities. Studies examining the policy 
activities of patient organisations have found evidence 
of relevant undeclared pharmaceutical industry 
funding in several forums, including the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the European 
Medicines Agency.1 4 5
Patient organisations have been defined as “public 
charities whose primary mission is to combat a 
particular disease or disability or to work towards 
improving the health and well-being of a particular 
population via activities including (but not limited 
to) providing patient education and services, funding 
research, and/or engaging in outreach advocacy.”2 
In times of increasing financial pressure on patient 
organisations, funding from industry may be welcomed 
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to sustain important charitable activities. When the 
interests of funders overlap with the charity’s area 
of work, however, this can give rise to institutional 
conflicts of interest in which “an institution’s own 
financial interests or the interests of its senior officials 
pose risks to the integrity of the institution’s primary 
interests and missions.”6 7 Such conflicts of interest 
hold considerable reputational risk and may damage 
the public’s confidence in the independence of patient 
organisations and policy decisions.8 Mitigation 
strategies include voluntary or mandatory disclosure 
of funding sources, codes of practice, conditions 
on funding from industry, and refusal to accept any 
industry funding.2
An important area of advocacy for patient 
organisations is that of decisions on public coverage of 
medicines and treatments, often undertaken by health 
technology assessment (HTA) agencies. HTA agencies 
are increasingly seeking to involve patients in their 
decision making processes, with participation now 
standard in agencies across North America, Europe, 
Asia, and Australasia.9-14 Incorporating patient 
perspectives into HTA provides unique information 
about the impact of the condition or treatment that 
may not be available elsewhere, leading to more 
informed, responsive, and legitimate decisions.15 16 
HTA agencies often work with patient organisations to 
recruit or represent patients, and surveys consistently 
show that HTA agencies most commonly engage with 
patient organisations rather than with individual 
patients or members of the public.10-13 17 18 At the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) in England, patient organisations are most 
routinely involved in the programme for assessing 
new and existing medicines and treatments known 
as technology appraisal. The English and Welsh 
National Health Services (NHS) are legally obliged to 
provide any technologies recommended by NICE’s 
technology appraisal.19 To date, NICE has asked 
patient organisations to declare potential interests 
only if an organisation’s representative is nominated 
to give evidence to a decision making committee.20 In 
this case, representatives should consider declaring 
any funding received by their organisation from the 
manufacturer of the technology under appraisal or a 
competitor product as an indirect specific interest. To 
review the effectiveness of this policy, we investigated 
the prevalence of interests—both declared and 
undeclared—among patient organisations contributing 
to the technology appraisal programme at NICE.
Methods
We collated a list of patient organisations contributing 
to technology appraisal guidance over two years 
of the programme. To do this, we used a publicly 
available list of NICE’s decisions (https://www.
nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/
nice-guidance/nice-technology-appraisal-guidance/
summary-of-decisions) to identify all technology 
appraisals published between 1 January 2015 and 
31 December 2016 (n=97).21 Technology appraisals 
can be discussed by the decision making committee at 
several meetings during the development process, with 
most evidence presented at the initial discussion. We 
therefore excluded any technology appraisal that had 
its initial discussion at a meeting earlier than 2015. 
We also excluded any technology appraisals that were 
reappraisals of technologies as part of the Cancer 
Drugs Fund,22 as well as any that were subsequently 
withdrawn, terminated, or replaced with later guidance 
(see figure 1).
Two authors (KM and HP) reviewed the documents 
for each technology appraisal publicly available on 
the NICE website (www.nice.org.uk) to identify any 
patient organisations that had contributed to that 
technology appraisal. Five main types of contributions 
exist (https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/
our-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-technology-
appraisal-guidance): commenting on the draft scope, 
which defines the patient population, comparator 
technologies, and outcomes covered by the appraisal; 
submitting written evidence to the decision making 
committee that will be considered alongside clinical 
and economic evidence; nominating a patient expert 
to provide written and oral evidence to the committee; 
nominating a clinical expert to provide written and 
oral evidence to the committee; and responding to 
consultations on draft guidance (usually held only 
when NICE is minded not to recommend a technolgy). 
Contributing patient organisations may also appeal 
the final recommendation made by NICE. Technology 
appraisals may assess multiple drugs or treatments 
at the same time. We therefore counted each occasion 
that a patient organisation contributed to a technology 
in a technology appraisal as a separate event. For each 
occasion, we noted the manufacturer of the technology 
under appraisal, as well as manufacturer(s) of 
any competitor products as designated by NICE in 
the publicly available matrix document for each 
technology appraisal.
We then assessed whether patient organisations 
contributing to the technology appraisal programme 
had declared any interests. All people attending 
committee meetings on behalf of an organisation 
are asked to declare any interests that might directly 
benefit them as individuals, as well as any relevant 
interests held by their organisation as indirect 
interests.20 For technology appraisals, patient experts 
are ideally people who have the condition and, where 
possible, have used the medicine or treatment under 
appraisal. Patient organisations may identify such 
people from their volunteers or beneficiary networks. 
However, patient experts are often employees, medical 
directors, or trustees of a patient organisation, with 
expertise on a condition gathered from their personal 
or professional experience. We restricted our analysis 
to these individuals, as other patient experts may 
not have considered that they were representing an 
organisation. Declarations of interests should occur at 
two points: a written declaration as part of a standard 
nomination form filled in by all experts, which may 
influence their selection for committee meetings; and 
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an oral declaration made by all experts at the start 
of any committee meetings. To investigate the first of 
these, we requested nomination forms held by NICE 
for all patient experts nominated for the eligible 
technology appraisal (see supplementary file for 
version of nomination form used during study period). 
One author with access to NICE’s internal records 
(HP) reviewed all available forms, noting whether the 
patient expert was an employee, trustee, or medical 
director of the nominating patient organisation and 
whether any indirect specific interests were declared 
(funding received by the organisation from the 
manufacturer(s) of the technology under appraisal or 
competitor products). To investigate oral declarations, 
two authors (KM and CS) reviewed minutes of the first 
committee meeting at which each technology appraisal 
was discussed, noting the same aspets as above. All 
minutes are publicly available on the NICE website 
(https://www.nice.org.uk/Get-Involved/Meetings-
in-public/Technology-Appraisal-Committee). Any 
differences or ambiguous cases were discussed 
between authors until resolution.
We then searched for declared pharmaceutical 
industry funding in relevant years. This was the year 
in which a patient organisation had contributed to 
a technology appraisal (that is, 2015 or 2016) and 
the previous year (2014 or 2015). This time period is 
in line with NICE’s policy, which requires an initial 
declaration of interests to cover the preceding 12 
month period.20 We searched the Association of 
British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI)’s Disclosure 
UK database (http://www.abpi.org.uk/ethics/ethical-
responsibility/disclosure-uk). The ABPI’s Code of 
Practice requires pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to disclose any financial support to healthcare 
professionals and organisations (including patient 
organisations), with data from 2015 available on 
the database.23 Two authors (KM and HP) searched 
the database for payments to all identified patient 
organisations in 2015 and 2016, extracting the 
year, amount, and manufacturer. We included 
payments to employees, medical directors, or 
trustees of that organisation and all payments listed 
under the organisation’s name even if the listed 
address was different from the registered office. 
We excluded payments if the organisation’s name 
indicated a different jurisdiction (for example, 
[patient organisation name] Northern Ireland) and 
this was a charity separately registered with the 
appropriate charity regulator (see below). Results 
were compared between authors, with discussion to 
resolve any discrepancies. As Disclosure UK is not 
yet comprehensive (http://www.abpi.org.uk/ethics/
ethical-responsibility/disclosure-uk/explore-the-
data-further/), we also searched the websites of all 
relevant manufacturers for disclosures of payments 
to patient organisations in 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
We converted currencies into pounds sterling where 
Patient organisations without full set of accounts
Patient organisations registered the year before contribution
Accounts for 2014 not available
Income for 2016 below threshold for mandatory filing of accounts
Change in charity structure during study period
3
2
1
1
7
Technology appraisals published in 2015 and 2016
Eligible technology appraisals published in 2015 and 2016
Technology appraisals excluded
Initial discussion before 2015
Reappraisal as part of Cancer Drugs Fund
Terminated as no manufacturer’s submission
Replaced with later guidance
Withdrawn
37
8
7
3
1
41
Patient organisations contributing to eligible technology appraisals
53
97
56
46
Patient organisations with full set of accounts
Fig 1 | Flow of technology appraisals and patient organisations
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necessary, using historical exchange rates from 
xe.com for 1 January 2014, 2015, and 2016.
Following the approach of McCoy et al, two authors 
(CS and AP) also reviewed the annual accounts (and 
accompanying annual reports where available) of 
patient organisations in relevant years to identify 
pharmaceutical industry funding.2 If accounts were not 
available on the organisation’s website, we searched 
the website of the appropriate charity regulator—that 
is, the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
charity-commission) or the Scottish Charity Regulator 
(https://www.oscr.org.uk). Charities in the UK can 
have different financial years, so we defined 2014 
accounts as having a financial year ending between 1 
July 2014 and 30 June 2015, 2015 accounts between 
1 July 2015 and 30 June 2016, and 2016 accounts 
between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017. We noted any 
reported funding from the pharmaceutical industry, 
including amount and manufacturer, and calculated 
the proportion of total funding that this represented 
for the organisation. Accounting standards for UK 
charities recommend recording substantial in-kind 
contributions (for example, providing catering for an 
event or printing promotional materials) with their 
approximate value. Another author (KM) reviewed the 
extracted data and compared any discrepancies with 
the primary data sources.
Two authors (RB and CS) also searched the websites 
of all patient organisations for any mention of 
pharmaceutical industry funding, including likely in-
kind contributions (such as “we thank X for supporting 
our event”). We noted the manufacturer, amount, and 
year of donation where available. We also searched 
for any policies related to pharmaceutical industry 
funding.
Discrepancies or lack of detail in these data sources 
prompted us to follow the approach of Perehudoff and 
Alves by contacting all patient organisations by email 
or website enquiry form as a final step.5 This allowed us 
to validate the findings from the previous steps, as well 
as to consult patient organisations on our proposed 
recommendations. We sent one reminder email after 
one week.
We pooled evidence of pharmaceutical industry 
funding from annual accounts/reports, websites, 
manufacturers’ disclosures, declarations of interests, 
and responses from patient organisations. We took the 
highest amount of funding from each manufacturer 
declared across all data sources to calculate total 
funding. For each patient organisation, we then 
noted whether it had accepted funding from the 
manufacturer(s) of a technology or competitor 
product(s) in the same year that it had contributed to the 
appraisal of that technology or the previous year, which 
NICE would consider a specific interest. As patient 
organisations can contribute to several technology 
appraisals, we did the same for each occasion that an 
organisation had contributed to a technology appraisal. 
If a specific interest was identified, we noted whether 
the NICE committee was aware of this interest through 
either written or oral declaration by the representative 
of the patient organisation. For the three occasions in 
which both nomination form (written declaration) and 
meeting minutes (oral declaration) were missing, we 
assumed that committees were aware of any interests. 
For specific interests of which committees were unaware, 
we noted whether this was because disclosure had not 
been required by NICE’s policy (that is, contributions 
from patient organisations other than nomination of 
experts).
To examine whether specific interests of unknown 
to NICE’s committees had an effect on decisions, we 
did a logistic regression of NICE’s decision for each 
technology (that is, recommended or not recommended 
for use in the NHS) against the presence of unknown 
specific interests. The results were inconclusive, but 
power was low, so we omitted the analysis from this 
report.
Patient and public involvement statement
The Public Involvement Programme, which supports 
involvement of patients, carers, and the public in 
NICE’s activities, advised on the design and conduct of 
this study. We also consulted with patient organisations 
about our proposed recommendations, and we plan 
to disseminate our findings to these organisations 
by email after publication. Individual patients and 
members of the public were not directly involved in the 
conduct of this study.
Results
NICE published 97 technology appraisals in 2015 
and 2016. We included 41 of these in the analysis 
(see figure 1 for reasons for exclusion). All but two 
technology appraisals received contributions from 
at least one patient organisation, with 53 different 
organisations identified (fig 1). Twenty three (43%) of 
these contributed to multiple technology appraisals 
over the two years (range one to six), with 117 
occasions in total when a patient organisation had 
contributed to a technology appraisal. In terms of type 
of contribution, patient organisations most frequently 
submitted evidence and nominated patient experts 
(table 1). Two thirds (52/76; 68%) of patient experts 
nominated by patient organisations were employees 
(including chief executives), trustees, or medical 
directors of that organisation.
Table 2 summarises evidence of pharmaceutical 
industry funding from patient organisations’ annual 
accounts/reports, websites, Disclosure UK, individual 
manufacturers’ disclosures, declarations of interests, 
and patient organisations’ responses. The income of 
patient organisations ranged from less than £20 000 
(€22 000; $25 000) to more than £119 million between 
2014 and 2016. The percentage of income from 
pharmaceutical industry funding ranged from less 
than 1% to one organisation deriving nearly 70% of its 
income from three manufacturers. Wide discrepancy 
existed between these data sources, including amounts 
of funding and named manufacturer(s). Individual 
manufacturers’ disclosures provided the most complete 
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picture, despite being available for only just over a 
third of manufacturers (31/87; 36%). Less than half of 
manufacturers in this study (42/87; 48%) submitted 
data to Disclosure UK in 2015 and 2016, limiting 
its usefulness. Along with lack of completeness, the 
database seems to have no unique identifier for patient 
organisations (such as registered charity number) and 
payments were often not consistent with those declared 
on manufacturers’ websites. Inconsistency between 
written and oral declarations was present on 22/36 
(61%) occasions. Contacting patient organisations 
resolved discrepancies between data sources in only 
a fifth of cases, with 11 (21%) organisations able to 
clarify manufacturers’ funding. Seventeen (32%) 
organisations replied but did not want to provide data, 
and 27 (51%) did not respond.
When we pooled all the evidence, more than 
two thirds (38/53; 72%) of patient organisations 
held specific interests (that is, funding from the 
manufacturer(s) of a technology or a competitor product 
in the same year as the organisation contributed to that 
technology’s appraisal or the previous year) (table 3). 
As patient organisations often contributed to multiple 
technology appraisals, we also examined evidence of 
pharmaceutical industry funding for each occasion 
that a patient organisation contributed to technology 
appraisals. Specific interests were present in almost 
four out of five (92/117; 79%) occasions that patient 
organisations contributed to technology appraisals in 
2015 and 2016.
After review of written and oral declarations of 
interests, we found that NICE’s decision making 
committees were aware of less than half (30/73; 41%) 
of all declarable specific interests (table 3). For nearly 
two thirds (71/114; 62%) of the specific interests 
unknown to committees, declaration was not required 
by NICE’s disclosure policy (that is, contributions 
from patient organisations other than nomination 
of representatives as patient experts). Overall, NICE 
committees were aware of less than a quarter (30/114, 
21%) of all specific interests identified (both declarable 
and non-declarable under current policy). Nearly all 
representatives who declared specific interests on 
behalf of their organisation at nomination stage were 
invited to attend the first committee meeting, with no 
difference between the proportions of those declaring 
interests and attending and those declaring no interests 
and attending (20/21 v 23/25; Fisher’s exact P=1). 
All representatives who declared specific interests on 
behalf of their organisation at the start of committee 
meetings were allowed to remain in the meeting and 
provide oral evidence.
We identified policies on pharmaceutical industry 
funding for nearly a third (16/53; 30%) of patient 
organisations, with two organisations not accepting 
any funding from manufacturers. Twelve organisations 
committed to disclosing any funding in annual reports 
or websites, 11 placed conditions on funding such as a 
cap on the percentage of income received from industry 
or from one manufacturer, and three organisations had 
specific clauses for policy and HTA activities.
Discussion
Virtually all NICE’s appraisals of medicines and 
treatments for use in the NHS in 2015 and 2016 received 
contributions from patient organisations, with many such 
organisations contributing to multiple appraisals. More 
than two thirds of patient organisations had accepted 
funding from the manufacturer(s) of a technology or 
a competitor product(s) in the same year that that they 
had contributed to the appraisal of that technology or in 
the previous year. NICE’s decision making committees 
were aware of less than a quarter of all specific 
interests identified. For almost two thirds of the specific 
interests unknown to committees, disclosure by patient 
organisations was not required by NICE’s policy.
Table 1 | Contributions to NICE technology appraisals by patient organisations in 
2015/16
Type of contribution No of occasions/total occasions (%)
Comments on draft scope* 50/117 (43)
Submission of written evidence† 78/117 (67)
Nomination of patient expert(s)† 76/117 (65)
Nomination of clinical expert(s)† 9/117 (8)
Comments on draft guidance† 47/81‡ (58)
Appeal against final recommendation 0/15‡ (0)
*Relevant records not available for 13 occasions.
†Relevant records not available for one occasion.
‡Not all technology appraisals have consultation on draft guidance or appeal.
Table 2 | Funding of patient organisations, 2014 to 2016
Funding indicator
Data source
Accounts/annual reports/websites* Disclosure UK† Individual manufacturers’ disclosures Total‡
Median (IQR) income§, £ 1 833 572 (341 323-3 857 722) - - -
Patient organisation reporting pharmaceutical 
industry funding in ≥1 relevant year¶ (%)
24/53 (45) 32/53 (60) 44/53 (85[83?]) 46/53 (87)
Median (IQR) percentage of income from 
pharmaceutical industry funding§
0 (0-1) .01 (0-0.3) 1.9 (0.3-12.5) 3.1 (0.1-24.6)
Median (IQR) total amount of pharmaceutical 
industry funding§, £
0 (0-25 750) 283 (0-5120) 37 707 (2500-135 081) 38 754 (6375-105 485)
Median (IQR) No of funding manufacturers§ 0 (0-2) 0.5 (0-1) 1.5 (0.5-2.7) 2. (0.5-5.5)
IQR=interquartile range.
*Complete set of accounts available for 46 (87%) patient organisations (see figure 1 for reasons for missing accounts).
†Only 2015 and 2016 data available.
‡Cumulative total from all data sources, including declarations of interest and responses from patient organisations. Nomination forms were available for all but five occasions (112/117; 96%), 
with two fifths (21/52; 40%) of representatives declaring interests at this stage. Committee meeting minutes were available for all but four occasions (113/117; 97%), with half (15/30; 50%) of 
attending representatives declaring interests at this stage. Data on funding manufacturers were received from 6/53 (11%) organisations.
§Median calculated from mean for each patient organisation over relevant years.
¶Relevant years are year of contribution to technology appraisal and previous year.
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Strengths and limitations of study
The main strength of this study is the systematic and 
comprehensive search for relevant interests of patient 
organisations. Despite these efforts, incomplete and 
inconsistent reporting by both patient organisations 
and manufacturers means that uncertainty remains 
about the extent to which these results reflect the 
true prevalence of interests. Many organisations did 
not make specific details of pharmaceutical industry 
funding (including in-kind contributions) publicly 
available and did not provide these when contacted 
directly. Restricting the search to the two year period 
stipulated by NICE’s policy may also have led to 
under-identification of relevant interests. Although 
the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in 
Health and the Scottish Medicines Consortium also 
use a two year period for patient representatives, the 
French Haute Autorité de Santé requires declarations 
to cover the previous five years.10 24-26 Furthermore, a 
recent investigation found evidence of payments by 
manufacturers to FDA advisors up to eight years after 
their participation in drug advisory committees.27 A 
longer period of investigation, both before and after 
participation in HTA decisions, might have identified a 
greater number of relevant interests. Overall, however, 
the marked prevalence of interests gathered from a 
highly fragmented disclosure landscape indicates 
that this study provides a valid baseline assessment. 
Finally, we assumed that all written declarations of 
interest were available to NICE’s committees; however, 
if this was not the case, inconsistency between written 
and oral declarations means that committees may have 
been unaware of a greater proportion of interests than 
noted here.
Comparison with other studies
In a similar study to ours, Abola and Prasad investigated 
the financial interests of speakers at meetings of the 
FDA Oncological Drugs Advisory Committee between 
2009 and 2014.1 One third of patient organisations 
represented by speakers had received funding from the 
manufacturer of the drug seeking marketing approval. 
However, the authors looked only at interests declared 
during the meeting, rather than exploring other data 
sources as in our study. A report for Health Action 
International followed a similar method to this study 
to examine funding of all patient organisations eligible 
to work with the European Medicines Agency in 2009 
on matters relevant to patients and consumers.5 
Fifteen of 23 (65%) patient organisations had received 
pharmaceutical industry funding between 2006 and 
2008, averaging 47-57% of total income, compared 
with 87% of patient organisations and 3% of income 
in our sample. The difference in income may be due 
to the European or international scope of the patient 
organisations (for example, Alzheimer Europe) or a 
greater amount of information obtained directly from 
patient organisations compared with our study. The 
authors also noted the difficulty in obtaining accurate 
information on funding through available sources, 
with only six organisations meeting the European 
Medicines Agency’s financial transparency criteria, 
and called for a uniform and detailed reporting system. 
Another relevant study undertook a content analysis 
of responses to a public consultation on the CDC’s 
guidelines on prescribing of opioids in chronic pain.4 
The authors found that opposition to the guidelines 
was significantly more common in both patient 
and professional organisations that had received 
funding from manufacturers of opioids, compared 
with organisations without any industry support. As 
NICE undertakes a consultation only if a committee is 
minded not to recommend a treatment, all responses 
included in this study were supportive of the treatment 
under appraisal so insufficient variation existed for us 
to undertake a similar analysis. Other possible source 
documents were the minutes of committee meetings 
and written statements from patient organisation, but 
these follow standard templates without sufficient 
variation for meaningful analysis. Finally, Jones 
compared the funding declared on the websites 
of manufacturers and UK patient organisations a 
decade ago and identified a similar lack of systematic 
disclosure by both sectors, with manufacturers more 
likely to acknowledge relationships than patient 
organisations.8 Although disclosed funding also 
amounted to only a small proportion of total income, 
belying concerns about agenda setting, very few patient 
organisations actively managed this relationship. For 
example, only a quarter of patient organisations (9/34; 
26%) had funding policies, nearly the same proportion 
as in our study conducted 10 years later (6/53; 30%). 
Table 3 | Specific interests and disclosure to National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)’s committees. Values are numbers (percentages)
Proportion
Funding from ≥1 manufacturer(s) of 
technology under appraisal
Funding from ≥1 manufacturer(s) of 
competitor product(s)
Total specific interests 
present*
Patient organisations with specific interests 34/53 (64) 34/53 (64) 38/53 (72)
Occasions with specific interests present 73/117 (62) 71/117 (61) 92/117 (9)
Specific interests known to NICE’s committees out of all declarable 
specific interests†
18/39 (46) 12/34 (35) 30/73 (41)‡
Specific interests unknown to NICE’s committees owing to NICE’s 
disclosure policy out of all unknown specific interests†§
34/55 (62) 37/59 (63) 71/114 (62)‡
Specific interests known to NICE’s committees out of all specific 
interests identified
18/73 (25) 12/71 (17) 30/144 (21)‡
*NICE considers both funding from manufacturer(s) of technology under appraisal and manufacturers of competitor products as specific interests.
†Denominator includes only specific interests in which nominated patient experts were employees, trustees, or medical directors of patient organisations. These people would be expected to 
declare their organisation’s interests as indirect interests.
‡Each specific interest counted separately, so values are sum of first two columns rather than number of occasions.
§NICE’s disclosure policy requires declaration of indirect interests only by nominated experts as above and not for other types of contributions by patient organisations.
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The author concludes that this “shallow approach 
to transparency” reduces the legitimacy of patient 
organisations as representatives of patients and carers 
in the policy process, which can be counteracted by 
properly executed disclosure.8
What this study adds
This study provides a timely examination of the 
effectiveness of NICE’s policy in identifying relevant 
relationships with industry among its stakeholders.28 
It is also one of the first study as far as we are aware 
to examine the interaction between industry funding 
and patient organisations in HTA decisions. Although 
previous studies (including a 2011 systematic review) 
have described increasing involvement of patients 
in HTA agencies worldwide, most have recognised 
the need for greater evaluation.10 11 16 This study 
also contributes to the quality standard of Health 
Technology Assessment International, which states 
that processes for involvement of patients in HTA 
should be regularly reflected on and reviewed, with 
the intent of continuous improvement.11 14-16 Other 
authors have noted the limitations of Disclosure UK 
for investigating payments to healthcare professionals, 
but this is the first study to our knowledge to report 
inconsistency with other data sources for payments to 
healthcare organisations.29 30
Policy implications
NICE has been a pioneer in patient involvement, and 
the extremely high contribution rate seen here is 
an indicator of the programme’s success.12 16 Also, 
interests do not equate to a lack of independence 
of an organisation. Patient organisations provide 
much needed services for free in a difficult financial 
environment.31 Manufacturers represent important 
stakeholders for these organisations, not only for 
funding but also for advocacy on patient needs. When 
contributing to public policy, however, transparency 
about funding sources is critical to allow decision 
makers to make informed judgments about the 
relevance of any declared interests.32 33 As Newton et 
al describe, organisations responsible for development 
and implementation of policy must institutionalise an 
approach to identify and manage perceived and actual 
conflicts of interest to maintain public confidence 
in decision making.33 NICE’s policy does this on an 
individual level, but it does not provide a standardised 
framework for interests held at an institutional level.20 
We recommend extending this policy to include 
disclosure standards for patient organisations that 
contribute to NICE’s activities. These standards need 
to balance maintaining credibility in the objectivity 
of HTA decisions with overly restrictive measures that 
discourage patient organisations from participating 
in HTA. We recommend that patient organisations 
should be required to declare specific interests 
when contributing to individual appraisals. For 
example, the Scottish Medicines Consortium asks 
patient organisations to provide details of previous 
pharmaceutical industry funding that accompanies 
each of their contributions and is updated annually.34 
Published appraisals include the proportion of income 
represented by pharmaceutical industry funding for 
each contributing patient organisation, including the 
manufacturer of the technology under appraisal.35 
As NICE’s committees were less aware of funding 
from competitors than from manufacturers, these 
should be specifically asked about in declarations. 
Financial interests of committee members related to 
competitors have led to French legal rulings against 
decisions by the Haute Autorité de Santé in the 
past, so such “negative” conflicts of interest should 
be treated as seriously as more visible “positive” 
conflicts of interest.26 On consultation, patient 
organisations requested clear guidance with examples 
of relevant interests that should be declared to support 
consistency of disclosure. Any declared funding 
can then be recorded in the published guidance. 
NICE could also ask manufacturers to disclose any 
funding to patient organisations as part of committee 
meetings, using the same information as for Disclosure 
UK but providing an accessible record in the public 
minutes. Similar disclosure by manufacturers for all 
patient organisations has been a legal requirement 
at the Haute Autorité de Santé since 2010.12 As good 
practice, NICE could encourage contributing patient 
organisations to have a policy on pharmaceutical 
industry funding, ideally with a framework for policy/
HTA activities. NICE should monitor this extended 
conflicts of interest policy and detail the consequences 
of non-compliance, which are absent from the current 
policy.20 We have shared these recommendations with 
NICE, which will review its policy in 2019.
To improve transparency on pharmaceutical 
industry funding, we recommend that more patient 
organisations should disclose funding sources with 
amounts on websites and in annual reports. Senior 
management should ensure that any individuals 
representing the organisation in policy activities are 
prepared to declare relevant interests. We recognise that 
many patient organisations would consider advocating 
for a specific product to be part of their aim to improve 
access to innovative treatments, but a policy of not 
accepting funding from manufacturers of endorsed 
technologies for at least one year before and after 
these activities would enhance their independence. 
We also recommend that more manufacturers should 
make full use of Disclosure UK, with the discrepancy 
between the database and declarations elsewhere 
meriting a more systematic analysis. The impact of 
these recommendations should be audited in three 
years. A continued lack of improvement could support 
a move from voluntary to mandatory disclosure of 
pharmaceutical industry funding, as is the case in the 
US and several European countries.8 26 36 For example, 
France now requires manufacturers to disclose all 
payments to patient organisations in a centralised 
public database.26 36 Declarations of interest for all 
contributors to the Haute Autorité de Santé are also 
publicly available and regularly validated against the 
disclosure database.37
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How this study could promote better decisions
Decisions on public funding of medicines and 
treatments are some of the most controversial in 
healthcare. Involvement of patients complements 
clinical and economic evidence with the experience of 
people actually living with the condition in question 
and is essential to an accurate and fair assessment 
of the value of new technologies.16 Yet if patient 
perspectives are truly given weight by decision makers, 
any potential bias must also be taken into account.10 
Although greater involvement of patients in HTA 
is an encouraging trend, a sign of effective patient 
involvement would be for patient organisations to be 
held to disclosure standards as robust as those for 
committee members. Our study has shown that NICE’s 
policy does not provide decision makers with sufficient 
information to assess all sources of evidence equally. 
Our results may be generalisable to other UK policy 
contexts with patient representation.31 For example, 
clinical commissioning groups are expected to involve 
patients in local commissioning of services, but this 
interaction is not covered in conflicts of interest 
guidance.38 39
Future research and conclusions
Our results are likely to be of interest to HTA agencies 
in other jurisdictions, which may find it useful to 
replicate this study. Moreover, other agencies may 
have made sufficient decisions on technologies to 
investigate the effect of undeclared specific interests on 
recommendations and may hold more detailed records 
to undertake qualitative analyses of contributions. 
We have examined patient organisations here, but 
the contributions of other stakeholder organisations 
such as professional associations and research groups 
would also be of interest. In conclusion, a more robust 
disclosure framework and greater transparency from 
patient organisations and manufacturers is needed 
to sustain the patient’s voice in policy and reassure 
the public that healthcare decisions are not unduly 
influenced by industry.8 10
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